A general contingency approach to the design of interorganizational service delivery systems / 286 by Whetten, David A.


Faculty Working Papers
A GENERAL CONTINGENCY APPROACH TO THE DESIGN
OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL SERVICE DELIVERY SYSTEMS
David A. Whetten
#286
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

FACULTY WORKING PAPERS
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
November 5, 1975
A GENERAL CONTINGENCY APPROACH TO THE DESIGN
OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL SERVICE DELIVERY SYSTEMS
David A. Whetten
#286

Interorganizational Project Working Paper Number 4
A GENERAL CONTINGENCY APPROACH
TO THE DESIGN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL SERVICE DELIVERY SYSTEMS
David A. Whetten
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois—Champaign
DRAFT: January 1975
This is a revision of a paper presented at the 69th
Meeting of the American Sociological Association in
August 27, 1974. The comments received from Hov;ard
Andy Van de Ven, Dick Hall and Pat Richer have been
useful in making these revisions. The material in
was prepared under Institutional Grant #31-34-70-02
Manpower Administration, U. S. Department of Labor,
undertaking such projects are encouraged to exprer.3
professional Judgment. Therefore, points of view o
stated in this document do not necessarily reprssen
position or policy of the U. S. Department of Labor
Annual
Montreal,
Aldrich,
very
this report
from the
Researchers
freely their
r opinions
t the official
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2012 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/generalcontingen286whet
The development of the study of organizations has progressed from
analysis at the intraorganizational level to the interorganizational
level and recently to the level of the organizational network or field.
At each level, organizational theorists have observed emergent properties
not present at the previous levels. The most noticeable demarcation is
between the intraorganizational and interorganizational levels of analysis.
Litwak and Hylton (1962), and Clark (1964) have proposed that the princi-
pal difference between interactions within organizations and between
organizations is the absence of a common authority structure for coordi-
nating activities and mediating conflicts at the interorganizational level.
This fact has significant implications for the study of public
organizations. The problems caused by the lack of coordination between
and within systems of organizations designed to deliver services to the
public are legendary. Their pervasiveness has been underscored by the
former Under Secretary of the Department of Labor, Max Lovell. "We still
have a cumbersome network of channels administering fragmented, overlapping
and sometimes competitive programs, often with gaps served by no programs,
ard without clearcut allocations of responsibility of sufficient flexi-
bility to reform itself." (Quoted in Aldrich, 1972)
Instances of these problems have been widely documented and analyzed
by researchers in several fields. An examination of the relevant litera-
ture produced numerous case studies of isolated attempts at interorganiza-
tional coordination between local public agencies. Most of these acco-jnts
vere descriptive in nature and rarely did the investigators make prescrip-
tive statements beyond pointing out how the weaknesses of the particular
collaborative venture might have been avoided. In addition, there have
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organizational coordination (IOC). Warren concludes his article, "The
Interorganizational Field as a Focus for Investigation", (1967) with a
model for interorganizational decision making in the community arena.
Jerald Hage (1974) has developed a more detailed model for coordinating
the activities between a specific group of organizations which provide
services for the mentally retarded (MR) . This model grew out of his
study of demonstration MR delivery systems in 5 cities.
The purpose of this paper is to glean from these case studies, models,
and other relevant literature material to build a general model which can
be used by administrators of public service programs as a guide for more
rationally designing IOC delivery systems. This model will be general in
the sense that it can hopefully be applied to all cases of IOC, given a
knowledge of the constraints or contingencies within a particular context.
It will not be general in the sense that one plan can be used for all
situations. Indeed, the principal assumption upon which this paper is
founded is that the design of a specific IOC delivery system must be
contingent upon the parameters within which it is to be established.
In this paper rational is defined as a conscious act by administrators
to weight the pros and cons or, if you will, to minimize the cost (or
negative consequences) and maximize the gains of a proposal. Clearly
there are trade-offs to any decision. Our purpose is to highlight for
program administrators the factors which previous studies of IOC systems
have shown to be important, and which therefore should be included in
their decision making process. To do this we will follow a problem/
solution format, i.e., we will first outline the problems which previous
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for these problems. Next we will isolate the most important contextual
dimensions within which IOC delivery systems are likely to operate, and
then finally we will attempt to identify which of the potential problems
are likely to be actual problems within the various contexts and demon-
strate the ability of the contingency approach to provide administrators
with decision rules for resolving the dilemmas encountered as they endeavor
to design problem free systems.
Before we begin, however, a short caveat is necessary. A discussion
of delivery systems presupposes a common definition of the systems being
discussed, but unfortunately this agreement has not existed heretofore
in much of the interorganizational literature on the topic. There are two
principal criteria which one can use to specify the organizations to be
included in an IOC system: 1. population characteristics, or 2. vertical
systemic linkages. We identify a population by the common phenotypic
characteristics of its members, e.g., all kangaroos. However, for our
purposes we are only interested in the kangaroos who are occupying the
same ecological niche. At the organizational level this guideline would
mean that an IOC system would be composed of organizations with a common
function (e.g., manpower, health) and/or a common client population
(e.g., youth, mentally retarded) in the city of Middletown. If these
organizations initiated a program to coordinate their activities it would
be in response to a common felt need, rather than the behest of a common
sponsor or funding source.
Conversely, system theorists like Miller (1955), Bertalanffy (1968),
Parsons (1966) , and Bateson (1972) define systems in hierarchical or
.
4vertical terms. They consider each system to be a sub-system in a larger
more encompassing system, which is in turn a sub-system, etc. This per-
spective would dictate that the organizations to be included within an IOC
system would all be agencies within a given federal, or corporate organi-
zation, in a given geographical area, e.g., all Department of Labor
programs in Middletown. Concern for coordination within this system would
generally be a product of the parent agency's desires for common account-
ing practices or a more standardized or efficient delivery mechanism.
These two different definitions can be diagrammed as shown in
Figure 1. The need to make explicit the presence or absence of vertical
ties among the organizations being coordinated will be highlighted at
several points in the remainder of the paper.
Insert Figure 1 here
Returning now to the outline of the paper, the need for a contingency
approach to IOC can be illustrated by briefly comparing the models proposed
by Hage and Warren. The recommendations made by the two authors are
qualitatively quite different. Much of the reason for these differences
becomes apparent when we consider the type of organizations to be co-
ordinated in the two models, the needs to be met by the proposed coordina-
tion efforts, and the authors' assumptions about the basic nature of
organizations.
To begin with, Warren's model includes all 'community decision
organizations' (CDO's) within a given community. This is a very diverse
group including such organizations as "community welfare councils, urban
renewal authorities, antipoverty organizations, housing authorities,
chambers of commerce, federations of churches, municipal health and
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tions have vastly different functions, goals, and vertical and horizontal
interorganizational linkages.
On the other hand, Hage is dealing only with service delivery organi-
zation which are serving a specific common clientele, namely, the mentally
retarded (MR) . His interest is in developing a mechanism whereby this
delivery system can become more effective by processing its clients simul-
taneously rather than serially. For Hage the major impediment to this
integration is the recalcitrance of the individual organizations. He
assumes that organizations have a high need to maintain their autonomy and
that it is therefore unlikely that they will establish joint programs on
their own initiative.
Warren, however, does not share Hage's assumptions regarding the
reluctance of organizations to cooperate. He assumes that organizations
do not consider their interaction in a zero-sum sense and that they are
therefore inclined to coordinate their activities if they are given the
opportunity. Following Durkheim's concept of an 'opaque environment',
he proposes that a lack of coordination is primarily due to the absence
of established channels of communication between organizations.
Given these dissimilar assumptions, objectives and contexts, it is
not surprising that the authors propose different strategies for increasing
cooperation between organizations. Warren emphasizes increasing the flow
of interagency information to facilitate coordination, whereas Hage designs
an elaborate structural mechanism to insure coordination.
More specifically, Warren recommends that to better enable each CDO
to meet its goals, two approaches can be taken: 1. Increase the efficiency
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directed activities, or 2. Increase the levels of goal attainment for
each organization simultaneously by establishing procedures for nine
activities. These are: 1. Joint data banks 2. Prompt communication
of change in policies 3. Increased feedback between programs 4. Increased
feedback from the community 5. Improved distribution of resources
6. Overlapping boards and staff via interagency committees 7. Increased
scope of interaction between organizations 8. Joint participation in
areas of common interest 9. A central decision making body to resolve
conflicts.
Hage's model is very different. He proposes that funding for providing
assistance to the mentally retarded be awarded to coalitions of organizations
with jointly coordinated programs and a central record keeping function,
rather than to individual MR service organizations. This policy would
establish what he calls 'supra-corporate' organizations to serve this client
population. He further proposes establishing a 'supra-corporate board' to
protect the public interest. It would be composed of 1/3 community elites,
1/3 professional staff and 1/3 representatives of the client population.
It is significant that half of Warren's recommendations involve in-
creasing the flow of communication and that those involving structural
linkages are very vague, ill-defined and receive very little emphasis in
the rest of his paper. In contrast, Hage's model is entirely structural
and thereby leads to a much higher degree of integration between the pro-
grams. Again, these differences can be traced back to the characteristics
of the organizations being coordinated (all community decision organizations
vs client specific organizations), the 'basic nature' of organizations
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(lack of information vs lack of resources)
.
This comparison highlights the fact that while both authors have
designed an IOC program to overcome specific problems within a given set
of contextual parameters, they have not systematically made these problems
and contests explicit in their models. Consequently it is difficult to
assess the appropriateness and feasibility of their proposals. Providing
a framework for improving the comprehensiveness of future IOC model building
efforts is the objective of the remainder of this paper.
I. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH IOC
A review of the literature dealing with interorganizational coordination
yielded a list of four problems of coordination likely to be encountered in
establishing and operating an IOC delivery system.
These are:
1. Coordination may reduce a system's potential for adaptation.
2. If coordination poses a threat to the autonomy of the organizations
to be integrated, they will be reticent to cooperate.
3. A lack of domain consensus within the collectivity may preclude
collaboration.
4. Horizontal coordination may conflict with vertical linkages,
and vice versa.
1. Integration may reduce a system's potential for adaptation .
Generally little attention is given to the disadvantages of system
integration in models for rationalizing delivery systems. However the
writings of social evolutionary and systems theorists such as Sahlin's
and Service (1960) 3 Stebbins (1965), and Bateson (1972), suggest a strong
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principal problem is suggested by Weick's provocative question: "Is
adaptability reduced by adaptation?" The reasoning is: The survival of
a system is a function of the complementarity of its characteristics with
the conditions of its environment; (Bateson, 1972; Campbell, 1965). Since
environments change (Emery & Trist, 1965; Terryberry, 1968), to insure its
viability a system must maintain a "pool of variability", i.e., a high
diversification of internal characteristics and decision rules. Because
integration and its attendant high formalization and standardization are
not conducive to innovative and creative solutions to problems (V. Thompson,
1965; Greiner, 1967; Aiken & Hage, 1968), nor to effectively dealing with
heterogeneous demands from the environment (Merton, 1940; Blau, 1955), nor
to overall system efficiency (because competition is forbidden, of Hirschman
and Lindblom's "Theory of Dysjointed Incrementalism", 1962), it may be
highly dysfunctional for a system to finely adapt itself to its present
ecological niche by forcing its subsystems to become highly specialized
and tightly integrated. In less esoteric terms it may not be wise for the
Department of Labor to concentrate too heavily on integrating its poverty
programs because the poor may become rich, or more likely, the dominant
interests in the country may dictate a change in priorities away from
helping the poor and towards helping the handicapped or the Vietnam
veterans. If this occurs, a highly integrated and specialized system may
be so finely tuned to its current function that it will be incapable of
meeting the changes in environmental conditions.
In general, the larger the scope of a system, the larger its task
(Thompson, 1967), or relevant (Dill, 1958) environment. In order for
programs operated by a federal agency to remain viable they must be
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sentiment ragarding funding priorities , as well as the idiosyncratic de-
mands and needs of the client populations and local program administrators
across the nation. In comparison, programs at the state level need only
adapt to their state environment, and local programs need only adapt to the
changes in the community environment. This line of reasoning has been used
by the advocates of special revenue sharing. Examined in this manner,
their argument that decategorized program funding administered at the local
level should enable programs to be more flexible and better able to adapt
to changes in their environment becomes true by definition.
2. If coordination poses a threat to the autonomy of the organizations
to be integrated they will be reticent to cooperate .
Gouldner (1959) and Sjoberg (1960) were two of the first sociologists
to argue that integration within a system can be viewed by subsystems as
highly problematic and threatening to their autonomy. It is clear that
organizations attempt to control their input (Carlson, 1964) and output
(Thompson, 1967) transactions with their environment so as to maintain their
autonomy. In their case studies of attempts by health and welfare agencies
to establish joint programs, Crow (1970) and Mansur, et al (1967), found
that organizations would not enter into a cooperative venture until they
were assured that their overall autonomy would not be threatened by the
venture and that that autonomy which they must inevitably surrender would
yield compensatory returns. In Hage's model the threat which IOC might pose
to the collaborating organizations was treated as the principal obstacle to
the integration of services. Collver*s (1970) question summarizes this
problem well: "How can autonomous groups pursuing their private interests
appear to work for common goals?"
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3. A lack of domain consensus within the system may preclude cooperation
.
Here domain consensus is broadly defined to include not only Levine
and White's (1961) two pre-requisites of agreement on the clients served,
and the types of services offered by the respective organizations, but also
agreement concerning the manner in which services should be offered. This
has been referred to as ideological consensus by Benson et al (1973) and as
paradigm agreement by Warren (1974). Collver's (1970) observation that
competitors don't cooperate is trite but true. It is just as true that
cooperation is impossible unless the parties agree on the purpose, scope
and appropriateness of the cooperative activity. In Form and Nosow's (1958)
study of the effects of disasters on communities they found that congruent
expectations were a prerequisite for cooperation between organizations.
Likewise, in their studies of attempts to coordinate activities between
agencies dealing with juvenile delinquency, Miller (1958), Hollister (1970)
and Nelson (1965) all cite the lack of agreement on the causes of, and
appropriate treatment for, delinquency problems as the principal reasons
for the failure of these efforts.
However this incongruence is not always apparent at the outset of IOC.
It is therefore possible for the interaction required by coordination be-
tween organizations to create conflicts between them as it makes apparent
their dissimilarities. This proposition has been discussed by others in
different contexts. For instance, at the general theory level, Simmel (1950)
has postulated that as the interaction between two elements increases the
incidence of conflict between them will also increase. Within the realm of
organizational theory, Selznick (1950) has criticized Weber's theory of
bureaucracy because it assumed that organizational members would interact
with one another based solely on the prescriptions of their positions.
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Selznick's point was that people interact as whole, rather than as com-
partmentalized, individuals and this is why bureaucratic rationalism is
only ideal and cannot account for the real phenomenon of conflict between
informal work groups and formal organizational authority.
Just as it is unrealistic to expect members of organizations to inter-
act only on the basis of their role requirements, it is unrealistic to
assume that the representatives of organizations assigned to an interorgani-
zational coordinating committee will interact solely on the basis of that
role. Their behavior will be greatly influenced by the values of the organ-
ization they represent, their role within that organization, their profes-
sional training, etc. As these representatives meet together to plan their
joint activities they may for the first time be confronted with the dissimi-
larities between their points of view regarding very fundamental and important
concerns. The more intense this interaction becomes the more readily
apparent the disparity between their perspectives will become and the more
difficult it will be to reach a consensus. It is in this manner that the
interaction process itself fosters conflict by generating an ethnocentristic
"we" versus "they" attitude.
4. Horizontal coordination may conflict with vertical linkages , and vice
versa .
As was pointed out earlier, most public organizations are members of
more than one system or network. If an IOC system is composed of organiza-
tions from the same population and if these organizations are not all members
of the same vertical system, then we can expect that the coordination within
the horizontal system may negatively affect the integration between each
organization and its respective vertical system. Naturally the more incom-
patible the requirements for lateral IOC are with the responsibilities of
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membership in its vertical system, the more conflict will be generated by
an agency's participation in both systems. Support for these propositions
comes from studies of the Forest Service and health agencies. In a section
of his book appropriately entitled "Challenges to Unity", Kaufman (1960)
describes the difficulty the Forest Service has in keeping local forest
rangers integrated within the system because of their identification with
the problems and perspectives of the communities in which they serve. The
more closely the forest ranger is tied into the local community the less he
can be counted on to represent the Forest Service if a conflict between the
two arises. Similarly, in their studies of interorganizational relations
Levine and White (1961) and Benson (1973) have shown how state rehabilitative
agencies who must justify their existence to their legislature find it nec-
essary to not accept as clients those people with disabilities which are not
easily and quickly rectified because they would give the agency the appearance
of being unsuccessful. This creates conflict between these agencies and
other health programs which are dealing with seriously debilitated patients
because they can't get the state to accept them for rehabilitation.
The significance of this problem is further highlighted by Mathiesen's
(1971) study of communications between prison officials and their environment
in Scandanavia. The conclusion of his study was a general principle: when
B (prison officials in his study) are dependent upon A (environment, e.g.,
parole board) for information demanded by C (prisoners), then B develops an
affective role with A as a means for securing that information. The result
is that this relationship is viewed with suspicion by C and this leads to
a reduction in communication between B and C. Applying Mathiesen's general
principle to this situation it is probable that horizontal systemic relation-
ships (analogous to A and B) will negatively affect vertical systemic
relationships (B and C)
.
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II. GENERAL SOLUTIONS FOR THE PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION
Given this somewhat formidable appearing list of problems to be en-
countered when coordination between organizations is attempted, what clues
does the literature give us regarding the solutions to these problems, or
the means whereby their negative effects can at least be mediated? The term
is used purposefully because the solutions proposed in this section are not
context specific. In other words, they are ideal solutions to ideal or
theoretical problems without reference to the specific conditions under which
the problems might occur. As contradictions between the general solutions
to different problems emerge in this section, the importance of the role of
contextual conditions as moderating variables will hopefully become apparent.
1. General solutions for the problem of coordination decreasing a system's
ability to adapt .
To review briefly the problem of adaptation reducing adaptability, the
more tightly integrated a system is and the more finely tuned it is to its
present ecological niche the more difficult it is for that system to adapt
to changes in environmental conditions. Actually this problem can be broken
down into two sub-problems: 1. structural inflexibility and 2. small pool
of variability.
A discussion of the dimensions of a system, of course, implies that a
system exists. While the systemness which is present in a particular IOC
delivery system is an empirical question, the point is that the more tightly
integrated the collaborating organizations are, the more inflexible the IOC
system will become. This is true not only of the linkages within the system
but also of the linkages between the system itself and other systems, e.g.,
other delivery systems, funding sources, local government, etc. The obvious
solution to this problem is for the system to remain as flexible as possible.
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Whereas this is generally the condition of the relations between organizations
within most delivery systems (not because of a rational decision to remain
flexible to enhance their adaptability, but because of the tenuous nature of
the arrangements upon which the system was built) there seems to be a seduc-
tive tendency for policy makers to equate effectiveness with permanence.
The result is that purposefully designed delivery systems are likely to be
tied solidly into an external structure, e.g., local governmental agencies,
in an effort to secure needed resources and legitimacy, and tightly linked
internally to enhance efficiency. Of course, both of these objectives are
2important for an effective operation. My purpose is simply to draw attention
to the possible unintended consequences of this policy. An example might
help substantiate the validity of my argument. The area of manpower services
is currently undergoing some rather drastic changes due to the recent shift
towards revenue sharing. Under this new philosophy manpower programs will
be funded by local governments rather than by the Department of Labor. Based
on a preliminary analysis of data collected in 1973 from 124 such agencies,
those programs which were previously tightly linked to their categorical
program hierarchy are having the most difficulty receiving funding under
Manpower Revenue Sharing. On the other hand, those organizations which were
members of less centralized systems which allowed them latitude to innovate
in response to local conditions had established linkages with local govern-
mental agencies in the course of their work and were therefore in the most
advantageous position to receive decentralized funding.
The second aspect of the problem is a low pool of variability. To
overcome this the delivery system should include as heterogeneous a mixture
of organizations as possible, in terms of the functions, professions and
perspectives of the organizations involved. In conditions of environmental
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turbulence, internal diversity is a critical resource. It enables the
system to interpret the changes in environmental inputs and to generate the
appropriate responses. "It takes equivocality to remove equivocality, or
as Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety states, it takes variety to destroy
variety." (Weick, 1969:40)
A large pool of variability will not only enhance the system's ability
to cope with changing environmental conditions, it will also increase the
effectiveness of the system's operation by tapping new and innovative ideas,
techniques and technologies from diverse sectors of the environment (Hage
and Aiken, 1967). Hage and Dewar (1973) found that one of the best pre-
dictors of organizational innovation was organizational complexity, i.e.,
the number of different occupational specialties in an organization. They
reasoned that complexity measures the permeability of an organization to
new information being generated by other organizations such as professional
associations. Of course the presence of different perspectives is useful to
a system only if it tolerates the expression of these divergent points of
view. This was also borne out by Hage and Dewar' s research. They report
that the single most important indicator of innovation is the attitudes of
organizational elites towards innovation.
2. General solutions for the problem of resistance to coordination caused
by perceived threat to organizational autonomy .
To decrease an organization's resistance to participating in a collab-
orative effort, the threat of the joint venture to the organization's
autonomy must be decreased. This can be done variously.
1. Convince the organization that coordinating its activities with
those of another organization will be beneficial. In Mansur's, et al, (1967)
study of Project ENABLE, the agencies involved agreed to collaborate once
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they were shown how the project would assist them in meeting their
individual goals. A similar method for convincing local units of corporate
systems that participation, and its consequent loss of autonomy, is accept-
able, is for the parent systems to reward those members who participate in
the activity. A frequent explanation for why change is often short lived
is the lack of supportive structure. If the Department of Labor and the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare want their agencies in Middletown
to coordinate their activities more, then rewards within the respective
systems should be contingent upon local coordination.
2. The collaborative activity should not require the participating
agencies to commit a substantial portion of their resources. If only part
of their programs or resources are involved, IOC will be less threatening
to the organization's identity. Hage's solution this problem is to use
only new funding for operating the delivery system. Under this arrangement
collaborating organizations would not be required to contribute any of their
current capital resources. The utility of this proposal was borne out in
Hollister's study of the coordination efforts between police youth bureaus
and a juvenile court. He found that ample funding independent of the joint
activity facilitated domain consensus which in turn increased coordination
between the agencies.
3. Involve organizations whose internal programs and activities are
loosely interconnected. Granovetter (1973) and Glassman (1973) have shown
3
that systems whose sub-systems are loosely joined are most stable. Within
the context of this discussion this means that loosely joined organizations
are capable of involving one of their programs in a joint venture without
disturbing the activities of the remainder of its programs. In this regard,
Mott (1968) found that some organizations can coordinate a single complementary
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function and still compete with one another in other activities. This is
more likely if the organizations involved have internally loosely joined
structures.
4. Vary the number of the organizations involved to reduce the threat
to any single organization. There is some difference of opinion concerning
the effect of the size of an organizational network on the autonomy of the
focal organization. In the original discussion of organization-sets, Evan
(1966) hypothesized that a large organization-set would result in low
autonomy for the focal organization. More recently Starbuck (1973:17-18)
has argued in favor of the opposite relationship. The resolution of these
contradictory predictions will have to await an empirical test. However,
the truth may lie somewhere in the middle since Kahn, et al, (1964) found
an (I relationship between conflict experienced by boundary role occupants
and number of different contacts.
3. General solutions for the problem of cooperation being precluded by
lack of domain consensus .
The basic solution is to reduce the variability in the perspectives
and values of the cooperating organizations. One way to accomplish this is
for the organizations to share joint members. In Harrison's (1971) study
of the relationships between a splinter pentecostal group and the Catholic
Church he found that the remarkably low level of conflict between these
groups was greatly facilitated by their overlapping membership. Given the
sect membership's desire to remain faithful to the church, the latter co-opted
the splinter group by having nuns and priests serve in leadership roles
within the group. Similarly, Pfeffer (1973) and Dooley (1969) have demon-
strated that overlapping board of director memberships greatly facilitates
coordination between organizations.
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A corollary approach is to homogenize the perspectives, values, goals,
etc., of the cooperating organizations before they interact by subjecting
them to the same socialization process. In his study of the procurement
practices of the Department of Defense Grossbard (1970) found that because
of the similarity of their perspectives, military procurement agencies and
industrial contractors were operating in many respects as if they were a
single organization. Because their members shared common professional
backgrounds, training and interests, and related so well to each other it
was sometimes difficult to draw organizational distinctions.
If the organizations being coordinated are members of corporate systems
or strong federal systems, any effort to make their perspectives compatible
must be initiated at the top by making the administrative policies governing
the respective systems compatible. Too often federal administrators expect
interaction between the local agencies of their systems which is not un-
animously supported by the federal heads. One of the goals of the Emergency
Employment Act was that the local EEA program, would convince the local
civil service to make their job requirements more realistic and therefore
less discriminating against the disadvantaged. However, in the absence of
any effort to initiate reform at the national level the local EEA admini-
strators were powerless to modify an institution as strong as the Civil
Service. (Whetten, 1973)
Another possible solution to this problem is to structure the interac-
tion process so that it will itself lead to positive sentiment between the
parties. Sherif's, et al, (1961) Robber's Cave experiment showed that if
interaction between dissimilar groups is based on their common need to reach
an objective which can only be obtained through cooperation, then their in-
teraction will lead to an increased acceptance of the opposing groups views.
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Pfeffer (1972) reports a somewhat analagous finding. He found that
managers' values in 'Company B' were very similar to the values of 'Company
A', when 'Company B* was dependent upon 'Company A'.
Placing these findings within the context of interorganizational coor-
dination, we can expect that if the fate of the organizations involved in
a joint effort depends upon the success of that effort, a high rate of inter-
organizational interaction will lead to consensus. One way this dependence
can be insured is to require that a substantial portion of the organizations'
resources be committed to the joint activity.
4. General solutions for the problem of the conflict between horizontal
coordination and vertical linkages .
For public agencies vertical linkages are the most important because
they provide them with their most critically needed resources: money and
legitimacy. Consequently, as a general rule when there is a conflict between
a focal organization's horizontal and vertical linkages it must follow the
dictates of the latter. With this kind of leverage a funding source which
wants to increase vertical integration can make this a condition of funding
local agencies. If, on the other hand, lateral coordination is more impor-
tant than vertical linkages for the functioning of the local agencies (as in
the case of most social service programs) then the parent system should make
funding contingent upon local coordination.
Another method for facilitating horizontal coordination has been used
by Urban Information Systems (Quinn, 1973). They developed a uniform com-
puterized accounting system which was adopted by four federal agencies on
a pilot study basis. These federal agencies are firmly committed to local
coordination and this uniform reporting system greatly increased their
ability to monitor the activities of local agencies and to assess their
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coordination efforts. By making the IOC activities between the local agencies
more visible to the respective federal offices, interagency coordination has
increased significantly.
III. AN EXAMINATION OF THE PARAMETERS OR CONTEXTS WITHIN WHICH IOC
OCCURS
.
As noted earlier there are numerous contradictions between the general
solutions proposed in Section II. For instance, one of the solutions to the
problem of 'lack of domain consensus precluding integration' is to reduce the
variability in the perspectives and values of the participating organizations.
This strategy, however, accentuates the negative unintended effect of inte-
gration on a system's ability to adapt. Joint activities between organizations
with similar functions, values, and staff severely restricts the emergent
system's pool of variability. In another case, if in order to reduce the
potential for conflict within a delivery system, the interacting organizations
are required to commit the bulk of their resources to the joint venture, the
likelihood of their participation is decreased because of the threat this
requirement poses to their need for autonomy. What we hope to demonstrate
in this section is that these contradictions reinforce the conclusion drawn
from the comparison between the IOC models proposed by Hage and Warren,
namely that the appropriateness of a design to resolve coordination prcbler^
is a function of the contexts in which they occur. What is required now
then is a delineation of the important parameters surrounding the creation
and operation of IOC delivery systems. These will be organized under the
following headings:
1. The availability of resources
2. The type of organizations involved
3. The type of coordination involved
4. The level at which the initiative for coordination originates
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1. Availability of resources in the environment
Following an open systems perspective, an organizations need to control
resources required to perform its technology and achieve its goals has re-
ceived considerable attention in the literature. Yuchtman and Seashore
(1967) base their theory of organizational effectiveness on an organization's
ability to reduce its dependence on its environment by controlling critical
resources. Aiken and Hage (1968) have argued that the principal motivation
for organizations to initiate joint programs is their common need to expand
their resource base. Most recently Benson has reaffirmed the central impor-
tance of resource control in organizational management: ". . . it is
assumed that organization decision makers are typically oriented to the
acquisition and defense of an adequate supply of resources. Such an orien-
tation becomes, for the decision makers, an operational definition of the
purposes of the organization and thus of their responsibilities as decision
makers." (1974, p. 4)
Several factors have been suggested as influencing the ability of an
organization to secure resources, e.g., the abundance of a given resource in
the environment (Aldrich, 1972; Benson, 1972); an organization's linkages
with resource bases outside the immediate environment (Levine and White, 1961;
Benson, 1974; Warren, 1974); its awareness of alternative sources of resources
(Van de Ven, 1974) as well as the intraorganizational structure of the organ-
ization (Whetten, 1974). Because of the need for parsimony in this paper
these dimensions will be aggregated into the single dimension of: scarcity/
abundance of needed resources. This is defined as the relative ease with
which an organization can secure resources required to perform its tasks.
Clearly the resource needs of individual organizations vary, however in
general most service delivery organizations are dependent upon an abundance
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of funding, staff, clients, task related linkages with other organizations,
4
and authority (Aldrich, 1972; Benson, 1974). Because the last two resources
have not been as widely discussed in the literature they deserve further
elaboration.
Many organizations perform a mediating, (Thompson, 1967) or brokerage,
function between their clients and the services provided by other organiza-
tions. A good example is the 'people processing organizations' (Hasenfeld,
1972), such as the employment service. The employment service provides
little in the way of direct services to their clients, other than some
vocational counseling. Consequently their effectiveness as a service delivery
organization is contingent upon their awareness of job and training opportun-
ities in other organizations in the community. Viewed in this light the large
sums of money which they have invested in developing referral systems and
job banks can be seen as an effort on their part to control this critical
resource.
As an organizational resource, "authority refers to the legitimation
of activities, the right and responsibility to carry out programs of a cer-
tain kind, dealing with a broad problem area of focus." (Benson, 1974, p. 4)
This is an extremely important resource for service delivery organizations
inasmuch as the probability of securing other resources is to a large extent
dependent upon the legitimacy afforded the focal organization. Various
strategies have been used by these organizations to enhance their legitimacy,
e.g., tieing their operations into a larger, well established parent body
(Aiken and Alford, 1970; Turk, 1973) and co-opting prominent community
leaders by placing them on the organization's board of directors (Pfeffer,
1972, 1973; Zald, 1969). In a broad treatment of this topic, Warren (1974)
has argued that populations or organizations act to reinforce each other's
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legitimacy by institutionalizing a mutually beneficial delineation of domains.
This consensus is jointly protected and perpetuated through nominal rather
than radical conflict and innovation and by an implicitly agreed upon defini-
tion of acceptable solutions to the inadequacies of service delivery which
favors modification of existing programs and policies and hinders the entry
of competing agencies into the field.
If we relate this contextual variable to the four IOC potential problems
it appears that both extremes increase the likelihood that IOC programs will
activate some of these problems. An organization operating in a scarce en-
vironment is necessarily facing considerable uncertainty because of its
vulnerability. Under these circumstances organizations will be extremely
cautious about entering into any new ventures which will require a drain on
their scanty resource supply. The rate of return which they would require
on an investment in collaboration would be greater than for organizations
with more resources, due to the fact that their 'stake' represents a larger
proportion of their total resource base. Another consequence of a high state
of uncertainty regarding resource acquisition is that it causes organizations
to be more protective of their domains. This jealousy over domain claims
decreases the likelihood that organizations will be able to agree on the pur-
poses, content and structure of an IOC program.
Turning from a condition of scarcity to one of abundance we find that
opulence also has its draw backs. Most significant is its affect on adapt-
ability. The richer an organization's environment the less incentive the
organization has to monitor changes in environmental conditions and to main-
tain a high pool of variability and a flexible structure to facilitate
adaptation to possible changes in these conditions. While it would require
a more drastic shift in the environment to negatively affect a rich organization,
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it is in a sense more vulnerable to such a change because a history of
security tends to foster an organizational myth that might cause it to
discount early trends which would otherwise serve as early warning signals.
Also, in conditions of abundance there is more likely to be conflicts be-
tween vertical and horizontal linkages. Only the rich organization can af-
ford to not strictly heed the wishes of the hierarchical levels above it.
A case in point are research labs which were at one time formally under the
auspices of a corporation or university but which have developed such a
large independent resource base, including a national reputation, that they
have gained a great deal of autonomy from the dictates of their parent or-
ganization and in some cases have even severed these ties completely. This
option does not exist for the poor organization because it is heavily depen-
dent upon its vertical linkage for supplying its resource needs and it must
consequently acquiesce to their wishes in cases involving a conflict of
interests.
2. Type of organizations involved in IOC: Compatibility
Here the bases for comparison are the degree to which the organizations
have shared goals, similar elite values, complementary technologies and re-
source needs. Reid (1967) proposed that the pursuit of similar goals fosters
exchanges and a division of labor and responsibilities between organizations.
However, the discrepancy between official and operational goals is a common
deterent to these coordination activities. Organizations with similar offi-
cial goals frequently have dissimilar operational goals. This is a due to
the organizations utilizing different technologies and having members with
different values and beliefs. As Warren (1974), Yuchtman and Seashore (1967),
Perrow (1970) and Etzioni (1961) have pointed out, organizations tend to
pursue objectives which are compatible with means which they have access to
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and the values of their elite. Using a frequently cited example, despite the
fact that both a police department and a family welfare agency profess a
common goal of reducing juvenile delinquency their use of differing technol-
ogies (incarceration vs counseling), based on different values systems
(punishment vs rehabilitation), interfer with inter-agency cooperation.
The complementarity of resource needs is another important variable for
assessing the compatibility of organizations. Hawley's (1951) discussion of
symbiosis and commensalism highlights this point. A symbiotic relationship
is perfectly compatible for both parties because they are mutually dependent
upon each other. Consequently, symbiotic relationships are ideal for inclu-
sion in IOC delivery systems since the organizations have a stake in assisting
each other. The more common and less ideal relationship is commensalism.
Literally the word means "eating from the same table". At the organizational
level this implies that two organizations have the same resource needs.
Whether or not sharing the same resource base with another organization will
lead to competition is dependent upon the abundance of the particular re-
source in question, and the number of others with the same needs. Presumably
the energy crisis has precipitated numerous conflicts over the distribution
of oil products between previously congenial members of the same industry.
In this regard Levine and White (1961) demonstrated that those service agen-
cies which were members of a state or national corporate structure (e.g.,
the American Cancer Society) had less of a need to compete with the other
agencies for resources in the local environment. In this manner what we have
referred to as vertical systemic linkages play an important role in inter-
organizational coordination since they permit cooperation between local
agencies which have similar resource needs. In summary, recalling Collver's
statement that "competitors won't cooperate," competition or compatibility
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cannot be predicted simply by comparing the technological needs of organiza-
tions. An additional critical factor is the abundance of the necessary re-
sources in the environment.
Attempting to initiate IOC between non-congruent organizations is
clearly problemtic. Because of differing value systems and modus operendi
it is likely that coordination of activities would prove to be highly
threatening, that the organizations could not obtain domain consensus, and
that the requirements for coordination between non-congruent organizations
would be incompatible with the respective organizations' linkages with their
vertical systems. Therefore, congruence is clearly an important prerequisite
for successful interorganizational coordination. Its only dysfunction is
that an IOC system composed of homogeneous or at least compatible organiza-
tions has by definition a smaller pool of variety to use as potential for
adaptation and less internal conflict which serves as a strong impetus for
innovation and change (Coser, 1954).
3. Type of coordination
This section deals with the characteristics of the interaction mecha-
nisms and processes. Clearly there are numerous possible ways for organiza-
tions to interact. These vary from Warren's proposal for an informal and
general exchange of information between community organizations to the
highly structured co-sponsorship of joint programs proposed by Hage. For
the purposes of this paper the most important dimensions of IOC are the
degree of structure and intensity.
The structure of an interaction refers to the extent to which trans-
actions are formally acknowledged by the participating parties and the ex-
tent to which the procedures governing their transactions and the elements
exchanged are clearly specified and remain fixed acrossed repeated trans-
actions. The more highly structured the linkage between organizations is
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the fewer coordination problems will arise to mar the interaction process.
In Reid's (1967) study of a coordination attempt between a school and a
family services agency, he reports that the relationship broke down largely
because the school never formalized its role. The agency staff reported
that when they would call the school about a matter they would be referred
from one office to another and they seldom spoke to the same person. On the
other hand Black and Kase (1963) report that the principal reason for the
success of a joint activity between a welfare department and a rehabilitation
agency was that each agency clearly specified their contact people for the
inter-agency exchange and agreed to specific procedures governing their
interaction. Some of the factors which determine the structureness of IOC
are: 1. Whether the interaction is mediated by a third party, e.g., a local
coordinating council, a vertical hierarcy or mandated by law. 2. The extent
to which procedures are codified. Personal agreements between representatives
of two organizations may greatly facilitate the flow of elements between their
respective organizations, but unless these procedures are specified and
formally included in the job description of the boundary personnel involved
in the transactions, personnel turnover will destroy the linkage.
The second important characteristic of the coordination process is in-
tensity, which is a measure of involvement. Marrett (1971) made a distinction
between two types of intensity, namely the amount of resources invested by
each organization and the frequency of interaction between the organizations.
As Hage, Reid and Marrett have both pointed out, the intensity of a relation-
ship strongly influences the participating agencies' attitudes regarding
coordination activities. Agencies are more cautious about engaging in ex-
changes which will involve a large amount of their resources. They naturally
are willing to accept less of a risk that the collaborative venture will fail
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and they are more inclined to make their cooperation contingent upon a re-
ciprocal exchange of resources with other participants. However, if agencies
do agree to engage in an intensive network of transactions they will be highly
committed to continue the relationship because of the sunk costs which they
have invested. Further, given an alternative between obtaining comparable
resources (e.g., clients or services) from an organization outside the net-
work and from one inside, they are more likely to choose the network member
in order to balance their receipts from, with their expenditures to, the
system. In summary, there is a definite trade-off in the effect of designing
a highly structured and intense IOC system. While on the one hand it facili-
tates the orderly flow of clients and services between organizations and
increases the likelihood that the participants will utilize the opportunities
available to them in the system once it has been established, it concomit-
tantly activates each of the four potential IOC problems. By tightly inter-
connecting the elements in a highly intense IOC system the notential for
adaptation of the system is greatly reduced. Further, it increases both the
likelihood that participating organizations with both vertical and horizontal
systemic linkages will obtain conflict between those ties and the possibility
that the agencies will be unable to achieve domain consensus since given the
size of the investment required each will endeavor to impose their technical
rationality on the others (Thompson, 1967; Warren, 1974; Marrett, 1971). The
conclusions seems to be that designing a highly structured and intense IOC
system will facilitate interactions between participants once the system has
been established, however, this type of system will be difficult to organize
initially if it involves autonomous organizations.
4. The point at which the initiative for coordination originates .
Here these are basically two possibilities. IOC can be spontaneously
initiated by the participating organizations themselves (population level
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definition in Figure 1) , or by some higher hierarchical level of authority
in the vertical system(s) (vertical system definition in Figure 1) to which
the participants belong. The first case has been referred to by Hage (1974)
as auto-correlation by Reid (1967) as unmediated coordination and by Lindblom
o
(1965) as coordination by mutual adjustment. In this situation, collabora-
tion is usually initiated in response to a common felt need. This consensus
regarding the need for coordination serves to justify the utility and legiti-
macy of the participating organizations' investment required to support and
sustain the exchange mechanisms. The result is that it is less likely that
the demands which coordination inevitably place on participating organizations
will be treated as threats to their autonomy.
This mode of coordination does tend to foster other of the IOC problems,
however. For instance, it is particularly vulnerable to disagreement between
participants over domain consensus. Because there is no mediating body to
assist in working out differences in philosophies and procedures for operating
programs and reaching objectives, disagreements over these key points is
likely to preclude collaboration accept in cases in which the future viability
of the agencies involved is contingent upon the success of their coordination
efforts. The likelihood of this problem interferring with IOC is reduced
when the participating organizations are all members of a common coordination
council such as a local welfare or community services council. In this case
the presence of such a council indicates a collective awareness of the goals
and activities of each of the members and the perpetuation of the council
can be taken as evidence that the participants accept each others respective
9domain claims as being legitimate and compatible with their own.
The problems caused by lack of domain consensus are minimized when IOC
is initiated by the head(s) of the vertical system(s) of the participating
agencies. Since vertical ties have been represented in this paper by the
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administrative hierarchy of a state or national programs, e.g., Neighborhood
Youth Corp. , Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, by definition the do-
mains of the organizations at the bottom of these hierarchies, which serve as
the operation or production arm of the program, are strictly and publicly
defined. Consequently coordination between organizations within the same
vertical system or between organizations in different systems (more likely)
will be facilitated by a clear understanding of the orientations and operations
of the participants. Further, any potential conflicts are generally apparent
from the outset to someone who is familiar with the guidelines of the respec-
tive programs and consequently it is possible for these to be worked out in
designing the coordination activities. This does not mean, however, that
the proposed exchanges with other programs will not be threatening to the
local agencies. While there may be unanimous agreement regarding the legiti-
macy of the role to be played by each of the participants there is still the
possibility that the union of those roles might be perceived as a threat to
some of the members.
Another factor is that because of their hierarchical control, an IOC
program initiated by the heads of vertical systems is likely to be more
formally structured than spontaneous coordination activities between local
agencies. This means that it will require less effort and resources to main-
tain the coordination structures. However, it also decreases the likelihood
that the emergent system will adapt to changes in its environment . This is
true not only because the formality of the program decreases its flexibility
but also because the relevant environment of the participating organizations
is larger and more complex (state or national vs community constituency).
Consequently it is more susceptible to change, more expensive to monitor and
therefore more difficult to adapt to.
To summarize, in this section we have discussed the important contextual
dimensions which together form the nexus in which ICC is organized and
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carried out. In addition, the relationships between these contextual vari-
ables and the problems likely to be encountered by IOC programs have been
discussed. These relationships are depicted in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 here
The utility of this matrix for administrators and designers of IOC sys-
tems is that it indicates for them the likelihood that the various potential
problems will be active problems within the specific contexts in which they
are operating. This is not always obvious. What are apparent are the mal-
functions of the system such as conflict over procedures or lack of utiliza-
tion of the IOC network, but these are often only the symptoms of more basic
underlying problems . Figure 2 shows us where to start looking to uncover
the real problems.
V. GENERAL CONTINGENCY APPROACH TO IOC
In the introduction we indicated that the purpose of this paper would
be to provide a guide for minimizing the problems which have beset IOC pro-
grams heretofore. Thus far we have indicated which of these problems will
have to be overcome in designing IOC delivery systems for each of four con-
textual dimensions. However, this information is not sufficient for planning
purposes for it does not identify the problems, and their solutions, for
combinations of the contextual dimensions and it does not provide a guide
for choosing between contradictory solutions to two or more problems which
are present within the same context or combination of contexts.
The ideal means for presenting the relationships between all of the com-
binations of the values for each of the four contextual dimensions and the
four IOC problems would be to place them in a 16x4 matrix. However, since a
discussion of that many cells would be impossible, an alternative is to dis-
cuss only the combinations of contextual conditions (from this hypothetical
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matrix) which are most likely to activate each of the four problems. These
are shown in Figure 3.
Insert Figure 3 here
This matrix more nearly represents the complexities faced by designers
and administrators of IOC programs. Rarely do they have the luxury of only
having to consider a single constraint. However, there are patterns in this
matrix which help simplify the complexity. For instance, with the exception
of the relationship between Type of Organizations and problem #3, the rela-
tionships between the first two contexts Availability of Resources and Type
of Organizations, and all of the problems are the same. Further, the combi-
nation of the values of these two contexts which activates problems #1 and #2
is the opposite of the combination which causes problems #3 and #4. This
means that while these two contextual dimensions have basically the same re-
lationships with the four problems, the values of each which resolve the
first two problems exacerbate the second two. The dilemma which this poses
suggests the need to order the four problems based on the severity of their
consequences for such a ranking could serve as a guide for making choices
between these trade-offs. The ordering depicted in Figure 3 represents what
we consider to be the immediate threat to the viability of an IOC program
presented by each of the potential problems. Consequently, in cases where all
of the problems cannot be solved simultaneously planners should be most con-
cerned about coping with problem #1, then problem #2, and so on. Based on
this guide, systems designed to include compatible organizations which have
an abundance of resources available to them are most likely to succeed.
The design implication of the discussion up to this point is that a
given problem can be minimized by establishing a certain combination of the
eight values of the contextual dimensions. However, in most situations it is
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not realistic to expect that a planner could manipulate all of these vari-
ables so as to obtain this optimal mix. Because it is more likely that he
could secure control over only one or two of the dimensions, it is important
for him to know the relative likelihood that each dimension would activate
each of the problems—or conversely, the potential of each of the contexts
for 'deactivating' each of the problems. In Figure 4 the relative impact of
the dimensions on each of the four problems is identified. The rank of *1'
indicates that that context is most likely to activate the problem area. In
addition to identifying the relative impact which each dimension has on each
of the problems, the overall relative effect of each of the dimensions on
all of the problems is reflected by the row totals.
Insert Figure 4 here
In addition to showing persons responsible for inter-agency coordination
how important it is for them to obtain control over each of the contextual
dimensions, Figure 4 also suggests that there are different approaches for
resolving each of the problems depending on which context it is in. The
first approach is to use the general solutions outlined earlier in the paper.
However, since in most cases these involve altering an important contextual
condition which in a given situation may not be controllable, an alternative
strategy is to manipulate the other important contextual variables so as to
mitigate the effect of the uncontrolled parameter. An example might help
make this clearer. Suppose a planner ascertains that disagreement between
two organizations regarding the appropriate methods for ameliorating the
social handicaps of a client population which they are cooperatively attempt-
ing to service has caused a deterioration of their relationship to the det-
riment of their clients. The general solutions for resolving a lack of
domain consensus are to include organizations which have, among other things,
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common professional orientations. However, if the resolution of the clients'
problems requires the combined application of the different technologies
utilized by these organizations and it is precisely the differences in the
technologies which has precipitated the ideological disagreement, then the
general solution is not a viable alternative. In such a case it might be
possible to manipulate the other variables in the context to mitigate the
effect of being locked into using incompatible organizations. The next most
important contextual variable is the Level of Initiation. If both of the
organizations are members of vertical systems it might be possible to convince
superiors in these heirarchies that the cooperative activity is increasing
the services performed by their 'program* and thereby receive their sanction
and support for the IOC activity. If this effort fails or is not an option,
it might be possible to alter the Type of Coordination structure by obtaining
an agreement from both organizations to service a reduced number of clients
or to service a restricted range of their needs. Another possibility would
be to establish an independent body which would screen the clients and as-
certain how much of the services provided by each organization is appropriate
on a case by case basis. By buffering the contact between the organizations
it might be possible to reduce their antagonisms toward one another.
This discussion suggests the following guideline: When control over
the contextual factors which would resolve a problem is not possible (as
prescribed by the general solutions) , reduce the impact of the problem by
manipulating other contextual dimensions which are related to the problem
using Figure 4 as a guide .
Considered together Figure 3 and 4 provide some assistance for resolving
the dilemmas created by contradictory general solutions to multiple problems
in a given context. One of the solutions for solving the problem of Domain
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Consensus was to create a dependency relationship between the collaborating
organizations such that their common fate would be based on the success of
the IOC program. An alternative strategy would be to minimize the intensity
of the interaction between the parties in order to reduce the likelihood that
the differences between them would become salient. Similar recommendations
of low scale involvement were made for solving the problem of Threat to
Autonomy in order to reduce the threat of collaboration to the participating
organizations. Figure 3 provides a point of reconciliation for these con-
tradictory prescriptions. The only difference between the combinations of
contexts which is most likely to precipitate these two problems is the value
of Level of Initiation . This suggests that if there is the potential for
a lack of cooperation between participating agencies and the parent system(s)
initiates the IOC program, then in order to insure compliance they should
stipulate that important resources which they control can be secured only on
the condition of cooperation. If on the other hand the coordination project
is initiated at the local level and there is no compulsion involved then the
principal concern should be to reduce the threat of coordination to the
agencies involved.
A similar contradiction exists between the recommendation to alleviate
the problem of a lack of domain consensus by including highly congruent or-
ganizations and the need to include non-congruent organizations in order to
increase the adaptive potential of the system. In this case Figure 3 does
not provide us with a moderating variable to use as a point for clarifica-
tion. In fact it shows that the relationships between the two problems and
three of the four contextual dimensions is opposite. At this point one might
ask, "Is there a difference in the relative impact which the context Type of
Organization has on the two problems?" If there is a clearcut difference
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then this could serve as the criterion for resolving the dilemma. Unfortu-
nately, Figure 4 shows that this contextual variable has a critical effect.
on both problems. It does indicate, however, that domain consensus is a
more critical problem than Reduction in Ability to Adapt and consequently its
resolution is more important.
From these examples we can derive a second guideline: When a manipulation
of the values of a contextual dimension which would solve one IOC problem is
likely to activate a second problem, attempt to resolve the dilemma by first
manipulating other contextual variables. If this is not feasible then choose
between the alternatives on the basis of the relative impact of the opposing
problems on the future viability of the IOC system .
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper has been to review and synthesize the litera-
ture on IOC for the benefit of those who are either planning, administering,
or studying interorganizational coordination. The objective was not to pro-
vide an IOC model which could be used in all situations to solve every prob-
lem but rather to demonstrate the utility of using a contingency approach
for effectively solving particular problems in specific contexts.
Obviously "the proof of the pudding is in the eating" and the utility
of this paper depends on its ability to demonstrate to both practitioners
and researchers that it is:
1. Necessary to explicitly analyze both the problems to be resolved
and the contextual dimensions involved as they endeavor to facili-
tate and/or study interactions between organizations.
2. Possible to resolve the dilemmas and contradictions created by the
complex nature of the problems and circumstances involved in IOC by
following the guidelines suggested herein.
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We set out to expand the "bounds of rationality" (March and Simon, 1958)
of those associated with IOC programs and this has hopefully been done by
suggesting new information to be considered and providing a framework for in-
creasing the comprehensibility and utility of that which is already available.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Since the first draft of this paper Warren has proposed some new approaches
and perspectives for IOC and because these might appear to some to call
into question the appropriateness of the objectives of this paper, they
require a comment. In his recent book, Warren (1974) has argued that
interorganizational coordination can have dysfunctional consequences.
The most important of which is that it legitimates the assumption that
additional coordination between existing programs is the most appropriate
approach to solving unmet needs of clients and it therefore directs at-
tention away from the possibility that these needs could best be met by
instituting new programs utilizing different philosophies and technologies.
One such novel approach has been proposed by Warren. He argues that the
public sector should be shifted from operating on the premise of elimi-
nating duplication of services wherever possible to encouraging competi-
tiveness wherever feasible. By providing the disadvantaged with a social
credit card for purchasing their services the viability of social ser-
vices programs would become contingent on their ability to satisfy the
needs of their clients instead of on their ability to document the
existence of these needs to funding agencies.
While Warren's astute observations regarding the unintended con-
sequences of coordination and his counter proposal for a radically dif-
ferent approach to providing social services are both provocative and
instructive they do not negate the important role played by interorgani-
zational coordination in the delivery of services to the needy. Proving
that a goal is ineffectual should not suggest that the means used to
reach it are not useful for pursuing more appropriate goals. Indeed if

public organizations were required to operate within the context of
some type of a modified free market the need for agencies to collaborate
would likely increase. IOC would be fostered by the fact that as agenc^2s
began to sell their services to potential clients (instead of funding
agencies) many of them would become acutely aware of the inadequacies of
their programs, facilities and staff. The fear of losing clients to new
competitors would serve as a centripetal force drawing organizations with
complementary needs and assets together into consortia. The case of small
colleges pooling their resources in order to buy expensive equipment and
sponsor costly programs needed to compete with larger universities, cited
by Clark (1964), supports this proposition. While it is obviously true
that systems of organizations, like single organizations, serve as tools
for obtaining the means desired by their leaders (Perrow, 1972), the
object of this paper is not to argue for or against propositions regarding
how they should be used. Instead our purpose is to point out to the de-
signers of IOC delivery systems the potential problems their programs
may encounter within different contextual circumstances and suggest some
strategies for overcoming these problems.
2. Aiken and Alford's (1970) study of Urban Renewal agencies has shown that
interorganizational linkages are a particularly important factor in
determining the success of new programs. "Newly established organiza-
tions may be severely limited because they are less likely to be in an
organizational network that can aid in achieving an adequate level of
coordination." (p. 662)
3. Ashby's (1952) definition of an ultra-stable system and Simon's (19G2)
analogy of organizations being structured like watches make the same
point
.

4. Benson argues that all resource needs boil down to money and authority,
inasmuch as money buys staff expertise, hardware, office space, training
slots in other organizations (and one might argue legitimacy) . While
this extreme simplification may be justified, an expanded list of re-
sources is used here for the purpose of illustration.
5. Mitroff and Killman (1974) have recently discussed the impact which or-
ganizational myths can have on the behavior of members.
6. See Klonglan et al (1972) and Finley (1970) on scaling the various types
of relationships between organizations and Marrett (1971), Aldrich (1972),
Van de Ven (1974) and Benson (1974) for a specification of the dimensions
of interorganizational relations.
7. Again the need for parsimony, which will become evident in the next sec-
tion, forces us to combine the dimensions of formalization and standardi-
zation (Marrett, 1971) into what we are calling "the degree of structure".
8. Klonglan et al (1971) present an excellent discussion of the differences
between these forms of coordination and their relative advantages and
disadvantages. See also Mott (1968).
9. It should be noted that this logic holds only for those cases in which
a council is established by the participating agencies for the purpose
,
of supervising and coordinating their inter-actions. It does not hold
v
for councils in which membership is mandated by the vertical system,
eg, the Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS)
.
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